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Terrorism as Rhetoric: An Argument of Values 
RICHARD w. LEEMAN 
Clemson University 
Howard Metzenbaum (on WKYC-TV, Cleveland): 
"If he's (Qaddafi) a party to killing innocent 
Americans, innocent people from all over the world, 
without any compunction whatsoever, then why need 
we have such compunction about seeing to it that he 
personally---" 
Mr. Feagler: "---So we assassinate him?" 
Senator Metzenbaum: "It would not be the first 
time."' 
In this essay I wish to explore why a liberal U.S. senator such as 
Metzenbaum would make a statement like the one above-and why the 
American public not only accepts but expects such rhetoric. I use 
"rhetoric" purposefully, for I will argue that by understanding terrorism as 
rhetoric, Metzenbaum's rhetoric in response can best be explicated. 
Before beginning, however, I must include the standard disclaimer 
necessary for analyzing terrorism. As Walter Laqueur writes, "No defini-
tion of terrorism can possibly cover all the varieties of terrorism that have 
appeared throughout history." 2 Because terrorism has no firm definition, 
generalizations are difficult if not impossible. In this essay, I will not at-
tempt to generalize for all terrorism. Rather, I wish to locate in the act of 
terrorism a rhetorical feature which is often present; namely, the epideictic 
function of rhetoric. I will not, and cannot, argue that the epideictic func-
tion is always featured, nor can I argue that it is always or even usually the 
predominant feature. What I do argue is that this epideictic feature ofter-
rorism can be critical for perceiving the full meaning of the terroristic act; 
and that failure to consider it may contribute to the difficulties of 
understanding terrorism. Perhaps of greater importance, rhetoric which 
arises in response to terrorism often does so with an understanding ofter-
rorism as epideictic. 
Terrorism as Epideictic Rhetoric 
Aristotle divided rhetoric into three genres: forensic (judicial), 
deliberative (political), and epideictic (ceremonial). 3 (1358a-1359b) Typical-
ly, scholars treat terrorism as deliberative rhetoric. For example, Michael 
Stohl in The Politics of Terrorism argues that terrorism has four major pur-
poses: to seek publicity (agenda-setting), to coerce bargaining, to force obe-
dience in the population, and/or to provoke authorities into repressive 
measures. Although he suggests that other purposes exist, these four are the 
major purposes, and Stohl 's list is characteristic of current thought.• Other 
purposes have been suggested, of course: psychological desire for violence, 
sociological frustration, criminal desire for money, etc; and the literature is 
replete with examples supporting each of these various "motivations for 
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terrorism." That terrorism can function as epideictic, however, receives on-
ly cursory attention. s Yet consideration of terrorism as epideictic is critical 
to understanding responses to ·it such as Metzenbaum's. 
Epideictic is often written off as simply "ceremonial" rhetoric; recent 
scholars, however, have recognized epideictic as significant because it acts 
as reinforcement for existing values. By praising some values and condemn-
ing others, epideictic discourse works to "increase the intensity of 
adherence to values held in common by the audience and the speaker. " 6 
Thus, an epideictic speech does not simply 'decorate the occasion;' epideic-
tic rhetoric is a confirming rhetoric which certifies the correctness of one's 
value hierarchy. 
To understand terrorism as epideictic, terrorism must be considered as 
response. Terrorism as response simply recognizes that rhetoric does not oc-
cur in a vacuum. Rhetoric is more dialogue than monologue: it arises within 
and in response to existing discourse and the patterns of that discourse. For 
example, terrorism can function as epideictic rhetoric because the act or 
threat of violence directly contravenes the "system," or "establishment." 
No matter whether the "system" is democratic or not, violence is an-
tithetical to the "order," because violence is disorderly. To use violence 
argues implicitly that the system is bad and, therefore, that values contrary 
to the system are good. This feature of violence extends beyond reaction to 
government, however. Violence is also antithetical to communication; i.e., 
when humans agree to communicate they imply to the other a respect for 
their person. To use violence is essentially to dehumanize one's victim, 
because communication is an essentially human characteristic.' When ter-
rorists threaten or use violence, they imply an epideictic rhetoric; viz, that 
their values are correct; the system's, wrong. 
The idea of actions arguing values is not new. Bowers and Ochs, for ex-
ample, divide disputants into two groups: horizontal and vertical deviants. 
Horizontal deviants are those who agree with their opponents on basic 
issues; their differences are ones of degree. Vertical deviants are those that 
disagree fundamentally, and they are the rhetors most likely to move 
towards obscene actions (e.g., flag desecration) or violence (token or ter-
roristic).' 
Although terrorism does not always act as epideictic, what is striking 
about the phenomenon is how often the terrorist argues for the total 
destruction of the "system." A kind of balancing occurs: the means are ex-
treme, so the ends are extreme also. Nechaev argued for the "prompt 
destruction of this filthy order. " 9 Bakunin thought that the robber was 
society's "enemy par excellence," for the robber had rejected society out of 
hand. 1° For the Tupamaros in Uruguay, "their primary objective, they say, 
is to discredit and destroy the political and economic system." 11 Ulrike 
Meinhof argued that the Baader-Meinhof group wanted to "hit the system 
in the face, to mobilize the masses, and to maintain international 
solidarity.'" 2 Of these two avowed purposes, the first and last are 
rhetorically epideictic; only the second functions as deliberative. 
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Students of terrorism frequently note that terrorists either seek to 
destroy the "system," or at least justify their violence by claiming to desire 
such destruction . Pridham notes that terrorism often involves a "fun -
damental rejection;" of recent left-wing groups Laqueur writes "they were 
certainly radical in the sense that they opposed 'the system,' the 'establish-
ment;' that they wanted violent change." 13 Implicitly acknowledging 
violence as epideictic, Lodge writes that terrorists "neither use nor respect 
accepted channels of communication with the authorities .. . they contest 
the legitimacy of the state's authorities." 14 
Terrorism, however, does not simply delegitimize the "system. " By de-
nying another's values-through violent actions-the terrorist 
simultaneously confirms his or· her own values. Such confirmation is 
precisely the function of epideictic rhetoric. Unless terrorism can be seen as 
epideictic, how does one explain Japanese Red Army hijackers using samuri 
swords? 15 Or that an Israeli counter-terrorist group called itself the "Wrath 
of God?" Fanon wrote in The Wretched of the Earth that Algerian ter-
rorism against the French would "restore self-respect," and Patrick Pearse 
justified Irish terrorism arguing that "Blood is a cleansing and sanctifying 
thing.'" 6 Suicide terrorists use the 'ultimate sacrifice' to demonstrate their 
commitment to particular values. 
David Rapoport, studying the Indian Thugs, Moslem Assassins and 
Jewish Sicarii, writes that "the holy terrorist believes that only a transcen-
dent purpose which fulfills the meaning of the universe can justify 
terror." 11 However, Rapoport argues that modern terrorism can be 
"ordered rationally,'' that it is designed for "various domestic and interna--
tional audiences," i.e., it is deliberative rhetoric. 18 Consequently, in 
Rapoport's view holy terrorism differs significantly from modern ter-
rorism. Although modern terrorism does not generally spring from a 
religious tradition, I would argue that it frequently has a 'religious' quality 
about it because it can function as epideictic. That is, the terroristic act may 
not be affirming religious values, as in the tradition of thefedayeen, but it is 
affirming the values of the terrorist, even if these values are largely of a 
negative, anti-statist variety. The negative act of violence confirms positive-
ly one's values and one's commitment to those values. 
Rapoport suggests that "the very idea of the holy entails contrast with 
the profane, the normal, or the natural." 19 Terroristic violence negates the 
profane order of affairs, normal daily living, our natural means of com-
munication. In the process it confirms its own "holiness." Thus, Laqueur 
notes that although various groups of anarchists were "confirmed 
atheists . . . their belief in their cause had a deeply religious quality.' ' 20 Nor 
does terroristic violence necessarily oppose a state in order to gain epideictic 
meaning; the act of violence carries with it a quality of confirmation 
because of its relationship to communication. For example, Laqueur writes 
that ''the SS too held to a perverse idealism, a belief that only they took 
values seriously. " 2 1 America is not immune to such epideictic rhetoric . 
Regarding the bombing of abortion clinics, a Ku Klux Klan editor writes 
35 
"God Bless" those courageous young White Chris-
tians accused of the bombings. They are doing God's 
work, while other so-called Christians set back in their 
pews like cowardly sheep and refuse to even utter a 
whisper of protest. 22 
Scholars often write that terrorism is ineffective. 23 Yet they make such 
judgements from a point of view which regards terrorism as deliberative 
rhetoric; i.e . , terrorism as a means towards effecting political change. Such 
a judgement is certainly a valid one to make, but it ignores terrorism as 
epideictic. However, terrorism has about it some distinctly non-deliberative 
qualities. For example, terrorism is generaJly a futile endeavor, yet it is on 
the rise. 24 Interestingly, Aristotle pointed out that epideictic rhetoric often 
praises that which is inexpedient. When holding a value becomes 
pragmatically costly, keeping that value becomes confirmation of its 
worth. 25 (1359a) 
Successful terrorism also serves as confirmation of terrorism's epideic-
tic potential. Several scholars note that terrorism is most successful when it 
works to rally an indigenous population against an outsider. 26 Partly this 
success is due to logistical reasons: colonial powers can be convinced to 'cut 
their losses,' terrorists can work more easily from a supportive native coun-
tryside, etc. Partly, however, the epideictic feature of terrorism works well 
in such an environment; as Horowitz notes, the PLO derives its strength 
from "its ability to reinforce and undergird organized opposition to 
Israel. .. not (from any ability to) inflict a mortal blow on its opponent. " 21 
The ends of epideictic are to 'undergird' and 'reinforce' a system of values; 
epideictic therefore 'undergirds' and 'reinforces' the group which shares 
those values. Terrorism does not have to function as an epideictic reinforce-
ment of values, nor is the epideictic feature of ' terroristic discourse' 
necessarily the only motivation for such rhetoric. Frequently, however, 
epideictic rhetoric plays an important role in justifying terrorism, even if 
such justification is not the actual 'motivation' as such. 
The Rhetoric of Response: Reflecting the Terror 
Not only does rhetoric act in response, in fact it often m1m1cs or 
reflects the rhetoric to which it responds. The "yes you are/ no I'm not" 
discourse of children is an exemplar of such reflection . Piaget, studying the 
language of children, called this "primitive argument," but such rhetoric is 
not confined to children. 21 Even mature rhetors use reflective rhetoric, for it 
is a natural mode of argumentation. For example , Edelman writes that 
bureaucrats use bureaucratic jargon-even when disagreeing-in order to 
signal that the disagreement is ' in-house.' That is, the jargon demonstrates 
that the rhetor still holds the values of the group, in this case the 
bureaucracy . 29 The epideictic rhetoric of terrorism, and the various 
responses to such rhetoric, can profitably be viewed from the perspective of 
rhetoric as reflection. 30 
Terrori sts themselves often perceive terrorism as reflective. The 
violence of their communication is a respon se to the violence of tho se they 
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oppose. West German terrorists, for example, considered their acts as the 
proper response to the "structural violence" of the system. 3 ' The Brigatte 
Rossi of Italy employed their terror to counter the "terror of the ruling 
class. " 32 In 1972, three Japanese terrorists opened fire in Israel's Lod air-
port. Working in conjunction with the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, the terrorists timed the raid to coincide with the fifth anniversary 
of the Six Day War. They named the terrorist team "The Squad of the mar-
tyr Patrick Urguello," the hijacking partner of Leila Khaled who, unlike 
Khaled, had died in the foray. And if this was not "justification" enough 
for the violence, Israelis found this note: 
The raid launched today was a revolutionary 
answer to the Israeli massacre performed in cold blood 
by the butcher Moshe Dayan and his devils against the 
martyr heroes Ali Taha and Abdel Aziz Elatrash ... This 
revolutionary answer was a tribute to the blood of two 
heroes who fell as a result of a cheap trick. 33 
Note that the violence is viewed as an appropriate response: it is an 
answer. Note, too, the language so characteristic of epideictic, or discourse 
of value: tribute, devils, heroes, martyrs. Terrorism is not only an affirma-
tion of values; it is very often "justified" with claims that its violence is an 
appropriate negation of the violence of others. 
Terrorism, then, frequently contains elements of epideictic, specifically 
an epideictic which condemns fundamentally the state, society, or 
whomever it opposes. It indicts its opposition, arguing that the terror 
employed is an appropriate response to the terror of the opposition. 
Because terrorism contravenes basic values, it is frequently viewed as a fun-
damental attack. When the Tupamaros killed kidnapped American Dan 
Mitrone in Uruguay, President Pacheco responded by labelling it "the 
greatest attack this country's political institutions have faced in this cen-
tury. " 34 Furlong is representative of scholarly opinion when he writes that 
"political terrorism is implicitly an attack on the authority of the state. " 31 
Terrorism within a country is not always considered an attack on that 
country's values or system, however. Whose rhetoric the terrorism 
"responds to" is critical; i.e., whose rhetoric and values are being negated 
through the use of violence. France is an illustrative case. Cerny notes that, 
during the seventies, most terrorism in France was sporadic, not directed 
against the French nation. Consequently, the system was not threatened, 
and most calls by "hard-liners ... fall on deaf ears." The "domestic brand 
of violence," however, by those such as the Breton Liberation Front, 
"arouses the political passions. " 36 
The typical response to terrorism is illustrative of its epideictic nature 
as well as the persuasive use of reflective rhetoric. The epicleictic nature of 
terrorism's attack on one's values justifies an extreme response to that 
rhetoric, and the violence inherent in terrorism suggests a reflective 
response of violence. Even a cursory survey of the literature on violence un-
covers terrorism frequently countered by more terrorism. Scholars typically 
label this a "backlash," and the very metaphor of backlash suggests the 
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reflective nature of such actions. 3 7 In Argentina the counter-terrorists ended 
up "mimicking the terrorists. " 38 In Uruguay, letters from right wing 
organizations threatened to kill fifty Tupamaros for every foreigner 
killed. 39 Israel arrested Rabbi Meir Kahane for smuggling weapons follow-
ing the Olympic massacre . He denied the allegation of arms smuggling, but 
he had argued that Israel should adopt the "terrorists ' tactics. "• 0 That the 
two rhetorical domains can continue this reflection indefinitely is recog-
nized in the phrase "cycle of violence," a phrase commonly employed both 
by the rhetors involved and the scholars observing from outside. 41 The 
literature on terrorism is filled with examples of public or state reaction to 
terrorism: the desire to retaliate, to respond in kind, to 'fight fire with fire.' 
In fact, one frequent aim of terrorism relies on this impulse: provocation. 
Guerillas such as Carlos Marighella urge their followers to violence with the 
argument that "the government has no alternative except to intensify 
repression. " 4 2 
However, to argue that counter-terrorism has "no alternative" but to 
respond with violence is a misreading of reflective rhetoric . Rhetors tend to 
reflect the rhetoric to which they respond . In this case, those whose values 
are attacked by terrorism's epideictic rhetoric tend to respond with counter-
violence. Such need not be the case. To begin, terrorism can be ignored, for 
it is not a life-threatening situation for most of the society or for the state. •3 
As recently as November of 1985 a U.S. military intelligence officer said 
that terrorism is "another form of warfare. But terrorism is not a major 
policy problem. It's a policy nuisance.,, .. Such a view finds terrorism less of 
a threat because the perspective is one of terrorism as warfare (i.e., in-
strumental), not terrorism as epideictic attack on one's values . 
Even when terrorism is perceived as epideictic, it can be ignored or 
minimized. When the Tupamaros killed liaison to Uruguay Dan Mitrone, 
the Nixon Administration issued only a "White House Statement." The 
statement argued that "this callous murder emphasizes the essential in-
humanity of the terrorists"-thus interpreting the murder as an epideictic 
affirming a value of inhumanity-but issued no calls for retaliation. " When 
the Lad airport massacre resulted in 25 killed and 72 wounded , including 
some Americans, Nixon released no statement, made no speeches, had no 
comments. 
Ignoring terrorism as rhetoric is not the only alternative, however. 
Rhetors may, for example, choose to use the rhetoric of democracy or 
legality in response. Sometimes this may be used simply as a means of af-
firming one's own values; it says, essentially, that in contrast to terrorism's 
inhumanity, I shall remain civilized. That is, because such rhetoric so stark-
ly highlights the values presented in terrorism, it similarly presents its own 
values in sharp relief. Such rhetoric typically talks of the 'civilized 
response,' the 'need to redouble diplomatic efforts,' and of 'com batting the 
problem within the existing legal framework. ' 
Rhetors may also employ democratic rhetoric in an effort to refor-
mulate the geography of the discourse. They recast the discussion into 
democratic language hoping that the opposition will reflect that formula. ' 6 
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The recent British-Irish pact on Northern Ireland is just such an attempt. 
The reaction to the pact, however, is not atypical. Reverend Ian Paisley 
called Thatcher a "quisling," and the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland was attacked by about fifty people shouting "traitor."" Such views 
are understandable, for the British have symbolically negated the values af-
firmed through violence by abandoning violence as a rhetorical tool. Of 
course, the situation is more complex than just epideictic symbolics: power, 
property, and lives are at stake, as well as mutual antipathy that makes any 
negotiation distasteful to some members of both sides. However, the sym-
bolic importance of the British attempting to abandon violence (in the form 
of the Home Guard) in favor of the democratic language of diplomacy and 
negotiation ought not be underestimated . 
Sometimes such non-reflective rhetoric does work. For example, Clut-
terback suggests the Geoffrey Jackson kidnapping as an illustrative case. 
Jackson, the British amabassador to Uruguay, was kidnapped and held by 
the Tupamaros for eight months. Communication between Jackson and his 
captors was at first tense, but Jackson's consistent use of gentle humor 
eventually broke through to his captors, and moved their relations to a 
more "human" level. 48 Such are the possibilities of using non-reflective 
rhetoric to fight fire not with more fire, but with water instead. 
Conclusions 
Terrorism has an epideictic feature inherent in its use of violence. 
Because violence is fundamentally antithetical to both the "system" and to 
human communication, it directs attention to the values which give rise to 
such violence. It also suggests implicitly that those values, like the violence, 
are antithetical to the values against whom the violence is directed. 
Marighella argued that urban guerilla violence in Brazil should be directed 
towards "the killing of a North American spy, of an agent of the dictator-
ship, of a police torturer, of a fascist personality in the government, . .. of a 
stool pigeon, informer, police agent, or police provocateur. "• 9 The list sug-
gests the values which Marighella would profess to hold, and those values 
he would disdain. Conversely, the Palestinian Zayed justified in-
discriminate violence because there are no innocents, all are guilty if only 
because "they had not 'raised a finger for the Palestinians .' " 50 That list of 
victims clearly asserts his values. 
Terrorism need not always be epideictic, nor is epideictic always the 
predominant feature of the discourse . Terrorists certainly have varied 
motivations, and they can mix those motivations in varying quantities . 
Genres of rhetoric, however, can also be mixed, and in varying degrees . 
Rhetoric can include forensic, epideictic and deliberative elements, or any 
two of the three. Further, a particular rhetor may decide to feature one 
genre over the other. 5 1 
However, terroristic violence i"]plies an epideictic facet even if the ter-
rorist does not mean it too. Thus, even if the violence is meant simply as a 
means to an end, e.g., to overthrow the government, the responding rhetor 
can plausibly read into the violence a rhetoric threatening the value system. 
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Further, because the threat is couched in symbol-the method of 
rhetoric-the lack of physical threat can be treated as immaterial. This sym-
bolic challenge to the system makes coherent Reagan's justification for 
sanctions on Libya: because of "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security and foreign policy of the U.S." 52 Such a rhetorical 
response may not be accurate, but it is coherent given the epideictic 
challenge to our system. 
Rhetors tend to reflect the rhetoric they oppose. Such is not necessarily 
the case, however. Whereas Nixon ignored the Lod airport massacre, 
Reagan has responded in a rather reflective manner. If the economic sanc-
tions fail to stop Libya's assistance, "I promise you that further steps will 
be taken. " B "Further steps," suggest that the economic violence of sanc-
tions are likely to be followed by a less metaphorical, more literal violence . 
Rhetoric is a dialogue . Rhetoric that "attacks," as terroristic violence 
does so both literally and symbolically, invites the rhetorical victim to re-
spond. Because rhetors tend to reflect such an attack, the resulting impulse 
is to "counter-attack." Thus, a Senator Metzenbaum can justify violence 
against Qaddafi for two reasons: the violence of Rome and Vienna 
"demands" an answer, and Qaddafi's violence invites, indeed justifies, a 
violent answer. The ease with which rhetors employ such rhetorical dialogue 
is evident in George Shultz's challenge to the European states which chose 
to avoid the response of sanction: 
If you don't like what we're doing, what do you 
suggest be done? Personally, I don ' t think the answer 
can be nothing. " 
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